China and the IMF, with the support of BRICS+, have offered a lifeline to the far-right government of Javier Milei in Argentina.

Eric Toussaint (Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt) 23 September 2025

In September 2025, after he had been president since December 2023, neofascist Javier Milei suffered an electoral defeat in a key election. This was the election in the province of Buenos Aires. This election renewed 46 seats in the provincial Chamber of Deputies and 23 in the provincial Senate. The Peronist opposition led Milei's party by 13 points. It holds a majority in the Buenos Aires provincial Senate. The capital province represents approximately 37 to 38 percent of the national electorate. The Buenos Aires provincial elections are always seen as a major test nationally, including for Javier Milei this year.

It is in this context that the role of the considerable financial aid provided by the IMF (with the unanimous support of the BRICS +), the World Bank , and China to President Milei in April 2025 must be judged. Milei was losing his economic and political gamble when the aforementioned lenders stepped in to provide him with a very significant oxygen tank, or, in other words, a lifeline. Indeed, while discontent was growing without significantly destabilizing Milei, his economic policy was clearly showing signs of failure. Contrary to his hopes, he had not succeeded in attracting the windfall of foreign capital on which he was counting. As a result, foreign exchange reserves to cover imports and debt repayment were at their lowest.

Had this lifeline not been offered to Milei, it is possible that he would have suffered a more significant political defeat in September 2025 and could have faced a very serious setback in the mid-term elections at the end of October 2025. Time will tell what the exact consequences of this aid to the neo-fascist Milei will be, especially when it comes to analyzing the results of the elections of October 26, 2025.

Milei's economic situation is so fragile that he was forced to appeal to Trump in September 2025 for the US Treasury to provide further financial aid before the elections. Trump responded positively, but the financial aid has not yet been disbursed at the time of writing.

In what context did the IMF and China provide a lifeline to Javier Milei in April 2025 ?
In April 2025, the IMF management approved a new credit of $20 billion to support the government of Javier Milei, saving it from a clear economic failure that would cost it dearly politically in the October 2025 elections [ 1 ] . The IMF almost immediately disbursed $12 billion, as the situation was so bad and required an urgent injection of foreign exchange reserves. China simultaneously renewed its swap credit agreement for the equivalent of $5 billion, which also constitutes vital aid for Milei. At the same time, the World Bank (WB) announced that it would lend $12 billion and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) a sum of $10 billion over a period of three years.

The Spanish conservative daily, El Mundo , announcing the measure, headlined:
" Argentina receives a $20 billion lifeline from the IMF. " and then continued: " This news comes at a crucial moment for the Argentine economy, which has begun to show worrying signs in recent weeks: inflation has stopped falling, the dollar has begun to rise, and the country's risk value has crossed the 1,000-point mark. In the midst of the international financial earthquake and an extremely delicate moment for his government, Javier Milei welcomed the $20 billion " lifeline " that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has thrown to Argentina. " Come on, Luis Caputo, damn it ! " the Argentine president wrote on the social network X on Tuesday night, quoting his Minister of Economy. " [ 2 ]

The daily newspaper Le Monde headlined on April 12, 2025 " Argentina obtains 42 billion dollars from international financial institutions " (20 billion from the IMF, 12 billion from the WB and 10 billion from the IDB, see above) and in the body of the article added:
" Milei needs this agreement like air ." Le Monde reported that the IMF's managing director, Bulgarian Kristalina Georgieva, had broadcast a message on X stating that " This is " recognition of the impressive progress made in stabilizing the economy " in Argentina and a " vote of confidence in the government's determination to continue reforms " [ 3 ] .

The Argentine conservative daily Clarín, for its part, indicated:
" The IMF will provide Argentina with a $20 billion loan under a four-year program. This includes an initial payment of $15 billion in fresh funds. " [ 4 ]

For its part, the Argentine government obviously welcomed the support provided by the IMF and used it in its communication to Argentine public opinion and foreign investors [ 5 ] .

As of this writing on September 22, 2025, according to the IMF website, Argentina owes it 40,260 million SDRs (SDR = the IMF unit of account [ 6 ] ), the equivalent of 55,253 million USD. Argentina is the country most exposed to the IMF and conversely the IMF is more exposed to Argentina than to any other country. If Argentina were unable to continue repayments to the IMF in the future, this would put the organization in great difficulty.

Argentina's debt to the IMF is about 12.6 times Argentina's quota [ 7 ] , or 12,600% of its quota. If we want to compare with the situation of other countries that are heavily dependent on the IMF, Greece's debt to the IMF is about 2.8 times its quota, Pakistan's debt to the IMF is about 3.3 times its quota, Egypt owes the IMF about 4.3 times its quota, Ukraine owes the IMF about 5.4 times its quota. So Argentina's situation is much more serious and the IMF is well aware of this.

What was Javier Milei's economic record ?
The timing of the IMF and other lenders' actions is crucial. Indeed, neofascist President Milei's hyper-brutal economic program was (and is) on the verge of failure, even though inflation had fallen. While early in his term, Milei had sharply devalued the Argentine currency against the dollar, he subsequently pursued a policy of exchange rate revaluation or appreciation. This policy allowed the Argentine peso to revalue against the dollar in 2025, but it also consumed a significant portion of dollar reserves, primarily to support import payments and allow the upper-middle class and capitalist class to purchase dollars for tourism abroad. As for the evolution of poverty in Argentina, after a sharp increase during the first half of Milei's presidency, it decreased by the end of 2024. Regarding economic activity, after a sharp decline in 2024 that prolonged the 2023 recession , a recovery occurred in 2025. But if we compare the level of gross domestic product reached in 2022 with that of 2025, we see growth of barely 1 % during this period. Thus, despite Milei's statements, the growth in 2025, which follows the 2023-2024 recession, must be put into perspective. Some sectors are growing (oil, agribusiness, both export-oriented) and others are in sharp decline (those that require the most labor). 150,000 construction jobs were lost, 30,000 in industry, and the downward trend continues. Pensions permanently lost 15 % of their purchasing power. In addition, 52,000 civil service positions were eliminated, and public spending was cut by nearly 35 %. This adjustment resulted in a budget surplus that was praised by the IMF leadership. But foreign exchange reserves were at their lowest level. The country faced enormous financial difficulties in paying for its imports and repaying its external debt, both to private creditors and to the IMF.

It is also necessary to take into account the important popular mobilizations that took place in 2024 and 2025, both among employees and retirees, in universities, within the feminist movement and among the unemployed organized in the different piquetero movements.

Despite this, Milei has managed to maintain public support, but this has begun to erode in the face of the government's continued refusal to increase social spending and the corruption scandal involving overcharging for medicines for people with disabilities , in which Karina Milei, the president's sister, is implicated. This scandal follows the $LIBRA cryptocurrency scandal, " Milei coin " [ 8 ] .

The economic failure would become evident to the country's public opinion a few months later, just before the October 2025 elections, which would see part of the legislative power renewed. Milei risked losing the parliamentary majority he enjoyed thanks to the support of the traditional right and some Peronist parliamentarians. And he risked a poor electoral result for his candidates.

As a result, Donald Trump put maximum pressure on the IMF to provide a lifeline to Milei.

Trump already came to the aid of a right-wing president in Argentina in 2018 during his first term, didn't he ?
Indeed, Trump had already done this in 2018 during his first term to support Mauricio Macri by obtaining $45 billion from the IMF to lend Argentina in an attempt to avoid electoral failure in 2019.

The 2018 loan was odious because it went against the interests of the population . A very large part of the loaned sum went abroad in the form of capital flight. Macri lost the presidential elections in October 2019. A Peronist front led by Alberto Fernandez and Cristina Kirchner won the elections by promising a change of policy in a progressive direction. But subsequently the Peronist government put in place did not have the courage to confront the creditors, particularly the IMF. In order to repay the odious debt contracted by Macri in 2018, the Peronist government itself requested a new loan from the IMF in 2022 for an amount of 45 billion dollars . The wait-and-see policies, which became increasingly unpopular, that this Peronist government had imposed under the guidance of the IMF (in order to meet the conditions that the latter set and to satisfy the interests of big capital) had caused great disappointment among its electoral base.

What was Javier Milei's economic bet ?
In the October 2023 elections, Milei won the presidential elections by presenting himself as a savior and using Trump-like communication methods. He immediately received congratulations from the IMF. Argentinian and international big business was pleased. But the shock measures he took caused a drop in consumption, a rise in poverty, and did not truly revive the economy. Foreign exchange reserves, which were already low, were further reduced. Milei hoped that his ultra-anti-popular austerity policy and multiple deregulation measures would attract a large influx of foreign capital. This did not happen. As a result, his government would lack the foreign exchange reserves to meet the repayments demanded by the IMF. To get out of this situation, he absolutely had to obtain a new loan from the IMF to continue repaying it and paying the import bill.

What was the discussion within the IMF about helping Milei ?
The IMF's management was facing a major internal debate. How could a very large new loan be justified when the official rule is that the IMF can only lend if the loan it provides makes the debt sustainable? However, it was clear that the two previous loans, the $45 billion in 2018, followed by the additional $45 billion in 2022, had not made the debt sustainable. The debt had increased dramatically.

Within the IMF leadership, voices were raised to say that the new loan and the new program associated with it would not produce better results than the previous ones. The IMF's permanent staff knew this very well. But Trump's pressure on Kristalina Georgieva, the Managing Director, and the staff was at its peak.

What was the position of the BRICS+ members within the IMF ?
What is striking is that the BRICS member countries accepted Trump's pressure and all voted in April 2025 in favor of granting the $20 billion loan. Lula's Brazil actively intervened to convince other Latin American countries to vote in favor of the loan, while Milei represents a real danger to democracy in the continent and supports Bolsonaro and the Brazilian far right, which hopes to win the Brazilian elections in October 2026.

China, Russia, India, South Africa, and the other new BRICS members with representatives on the IMF board all voted in favor of the $20 billion loan. China (6.08%), Russia (2.59%), Brazil (2.22%), India (2.63%), and South Africa (0.63%) together have just over 14 % of the votes in the IMF board (roughly the same as in the World Bank). If we add the 5 new BRICS members, namely Indonesia (0.95% of the votes), Iran (0.74%), the United Arab Emirates (0.49%), Egypt (0.43%) and Ethiopia (0.09%), the BRICS+ hold almost 17% of the votes (For the percentages, see https://www.imf.org/en/About/executive-board/members-quotas ). However, with 15%, it is possible to block a decision because an 85% majority is necessary in the event of a vote on controversial issues. In any case, regardless of the vote calculation, it is certain that the BRICS representatives could have opposed the decision in the discussion and made it very difficult to take because other countries were clearly hesitant.

It is therefore very serious that the BRICS leaders have decided to support Milei, taking the risk of giving him the opportunity to stay in power and having a contagion effect on the rest of the region and beyond. This could have even more dramatic consequences than those we are currently experiencing, both for the Argentine people and for many other peoples.

What is happening between Argentina, the IMF, and other creditors will encourage other governments to pursue increasingly brutal anti-social policies because they will know that even in the event of obvious macroeconomic failure, they can always count on IMF assistance.

What was China's role ?
It is important here to explain the role played by China, which is Argentina's second largest trading partner, well ahead of the United States. China buys about 15% of Argentina's exports, Brazil buys 20%, and the United States 7 to 8%. Argentina's main exports to China are soybeans and their derivatives , corn, wheat, beef, wine, oil and petroleum products, and also lithium. Fifteen percent of Argentina's imports come from China and consist mainly of industrial machinery and equipment, vehicles, spare parts, and electronic products. Relations between China and Argentina are therefore emblematic of relations between an industrialized country and a country that primarily exports raw materials.

On the eve of the IMF's loan to Argentina in early April 2025, China renewed a line of credit for the equivalent of $5 billion to Milei's Argentina (as it had done with right-wing President Mauricio Macri in 2018 and then with the Peronist President Alberto Fernandez who succeeded him). China has therefore also provided a lifeline for Milei. Indeed, the credit granted by China allows Milei's government, if necessary, to make repayments to the IMF, to reimburse other creditors, including Chinese ones, and to pay part of its bill for importing Chinese industrial products.

It is important to note that the Chinese credit swap allows Milei to show a positive level of gross foreign exchange reserves, while in reality, the net level of reserves is negative, as shown by a note from the rating agency Fitch dated April 2025, which can be consulted here [ 9 ] . Trump pressured Milei not to renew his request for credit from China [ 10 ] . But Milei was in such a desperate situation that he resisted the pressing request of his mentor Trump. China helped Milei and at the same time ensured that he would be able to continue paying the Argentine debt to him and that he could continue paying his Chinese import bills. China thus prioritized its economic and geostrategic interests.

Conclusions
The BRICS have adopted a very complacent attitude within the IMF leadership towards Trump and his allies, and this does not prevent the President of the United States from being on the offensive against them.

Javier Milei's Argentina illustrates the extent to which politics and international finance are inseparable. In April 2025, the IMF, China, the World Bank, and the IDB offered the Argentine president a $42 billion lifeline, allowing him to fend off an imminent crisis. This support, obtained under pressure from Donald Trump and validated by the BRICS+, reveals that geopolitical considerations outweigh any economic logic of debt sustainability. Argentina's situation is nevertheless alarming: record indebtedness to the IMF, depleted foreign exchange reserves, almost zero growth if we take the period 2022-2025, and a social fabric deeply weakened by austerity policies. Despite a budget surplus hailed by creditors, popular discontent is palpable. The BRICS+'s choice to support Milei, in contradiction with their discourse of breaking away from the Western financial order, confirms that their priorities remain dictated by their own commercial and strategic interests. China, in particular, has prioritized the security of its exports and debts . Lula's government has also prioritized its economic interests because it is counting on IMF money to ensure that Milei's Argentina can continue to pay its import bill from Brazil. Ultimately, this aid guarantees neither Milei's political stability nor the sustainable recovery of the Argentine economy. It only postpones the deadline, at the cost of an ever more unsustainable debt and the continuation of harsh sacrifices for the working classes.
https://www.cadtm.org/La-Chine-et-le-FMI-avec-le-soutien-des-BRICS-ont-offert-une-bouee-de-sauvetage?

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