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Interview from behind bars BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Here at Penal Colony No. 4, we publish monthly statistics for the camp, including the number of prisoners leaving for the SVO. I closely monitor these statistics. And here's the trend. I was told that in 2023, there were hundreds of people signing contracts in some months. When I arrived at the camp in May 2024, the monthly numbers hovered around 35-45 people, and then, starting in late summer, they began a steady and sharp decline, until December 2024, when only one person left. Then there was a slight increase again, but not a dramatic one. Lately, 8 to 11 people have been leaving per month. Moreover, I can confidently say that even this small increase is connected precisely to the hope for peace. Many prisoners hoped that by signing the contract, they wouldn't have time to go to the front, and that a ceasefire would come sooner. I've spoken with many of the signatories and heard this from them. Moreover, the recruiters themselves constantly said, "The military operations will end soon, you might not even make it to the front." Unfortunately, this hasn't come true so far. However, the recruiters' visits have become less frequent. Another instructive observation concerns the motivation of those who sign up. Not only have I never encountered anyone ideologically motivated, but I've also repeatedly encountered staunch opponents of the SVO. So why do they sign the contract? Recruiters emphasized the need for release and money for their families, without much reference to patriotism. It's a purely pragmatic decision, dictated not by conviction but by life circumstances. On the other hand, we have a number of ideologically motivated patriots who parrot propaganda, but not once has anyone signed up to fight. Not once! The camp has many people sentenced under Article 337 (absence without leave from a military unit). This is not to be confused, by the way, with deserters, who flee with weapons; that's a different article. So, there's a curious dynamic here, too. For the most part, they dissuade other prisoners from signing the contract, but some of them signed it themselves, not for ideological reasons, but because they needed to get rid of this very article. A man says: "I don't want to be thought of as having abandoned my comrades, and I don't like this war at all." In general, I think it's crucial to avoid simplistic, black-and-white assessments. Like, if someone fought, they're for the war. Or, conversely, if someone doesn't want to fight, they're against it. It's all much more complicated, unfortunately. 4. You've been in prison for over two years, with a short break. Do you regret not taking advantage of the opportunity when you were released at the end of 2023? You could have emigrated and engaged in information and organizational activities. BORIS KAGARLITSKY: I have no regrets. I made a choice, and I consider it not just the right one, but an extremely important one. When people tell me that while abroad, I could have spoken more forcefully and used harsher language, I remind them that that's not my style at all. I've always tried, and continue to try, to speak correctly and politely, even when talking to people I don't think deserve respect. But restraint only makes speech more persuasive. Of course, when you find yourself in prison or a camp, work is more difficult. There's no internet, no library access, and communication with colleagues and comrades is limited. Although, by the way, I must once again promote the FSIN-letter system. Thanks to it, I've not only received the necessary information many times, but also constantly communicated with a large number of people, many of whom I would never have met in freedom. And often, these are very interesting and useful contacts. For example, Russian Post regularly loses my letters or letters addressed to me. So, some things work even better in our prisons than on the outside. 5. I just have a clarifying question. Do you consider your choice to remain in Russia the right one for yourself or for all left-wing oppositionists in general? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: I certainly don't intend to judge people who have emigrated, especially if they manage to support or create projects there that are useful to the common cause. Work can and should be done in all circumstances. We complement and support each other. Some are in exile, some are within the country, and some are in prison. The main thing is that we all maintain solidarity and faith in our cause. 6. Do you feel informationally isolated? How do you get current information? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: There are, of course, certain difficulties in obtaining information. But it's not critical. We'll still find out the news that's truly important and what we're all waiting for. And here the difference between people in prison and on the outside isn't great. In some ways, we're even better off—we're not distracted by trivialities. I often notice a certain depression and pessimism reigning among people on the outside. And here's the funny thing: I have to cheer them up from prison. Here (in the colony), they're good at distinguishing between the important and the unimportant. Waiting is always a rather agonizing process. Prison is the wait for freedom. And what happens outside the gates? It's the same thing. Only it's not as obvious, not as clear. Here, it's much simpler. 7. Since we're on the topic of media and information, Rabkor is the oldest left-wing channel on YouTube. I specifically checked—it dates back to the Bolotnaya Square protests. How do you generally assess the era (which is likely coming to an end) of left-wing YouTube? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: I believe that the era that began not even with the "Bolotnaya Square protests" but with the global economic crisis of 2008-2010, the "Great Recession," is not yet over. I sincerely hope it is coming to an end, but alas, it is not yet over. And the development of left-wing YouTube channels reflects much more general processes. The "Great Recession" revealed the exhaustion of the neoliberal model of capitalism globally. Locally, in Russia, the "managed democracy" model, which began to be built under Yeltsin with the 1993 coup and which finally took shape during Putin's first term, is in crisis. By 2010, it became clear that there was a demand for change. And the political dilemma was clear to everyone. Either genuine democratization or, conversely, a transition to open authoritarianism. Russia's ruling circles were terrified of democratization, as it could lead to a loss of control. And it wasn't just those in power who were terrified. The leaders of the liberal opposition, as well as the business representatives who supported them, were also afraid of uncontrollable processes. As a result, instead of radical change, we got a useless "swamp protest." The name proved symbolic. All the energy of the protest was lost in the swamp of liberal opportunism. The trouble is that the events of that time, on the one hand, strengthened the left, one could even say that to some extent they created a new left movement, but on the other hand, they did not allow it to develop to such a degree as to play a decisive role in the course of events. The crisis of the early 2010s was already a capitalist crisis. The connection between economic problems and neoliberal policies became obvious to anyone capable of critical analysis, and a new generation, formed after the Soviet Union, had emerged. If before that, the left had consisted primarily of groups of intellectuals capable of comprehending the economic and social contradictions that had developed since 1991 and freed from official Soviet dogmatism, then in the 2010s, a new environment began to form; indeed, this environment began to reproduce and develop. This is where stable audiences for projects like "Rabkor," "Prostye Chisly," "Vestnik Buri," and others began to emerge. But the point is that this growth occurred against a backdrop of political weakness. Establishing an independent political force was not yet possible. Hence the attempts to collaborate with official opposition parties, which at that time had not yet completely discredited themselves, although we were well aware of their flaws and publicly discussed them. Another response to the emerging contradiction has become apolitical. "We're not interested in politics; it's all terrible, pure opportunism, bourgeois institutions, and all that. We immerse ourselves in pure theory, the world of ideas, or historical reconstruction." The problem is that a theory that deliberately turns its back on modernity is a worthless theory. And, again, at the level of abstraction, it's easy to draw a distinction between the new ideas and needs that have emerged in the 21st century, on the one hand, and the legacy of the 1990s, which, in turn, is burdened by the Soviet legacy, on the other. In real life, everything is much more complex and confusing. Abstract critiques of capitalism and liberalism allowed not only different people to meet in the same space, but also very different, often even opposing, ideas to be found in a single mind. And there were (and still are) many such minds. And we need to work with them. It's impossible not to recall the Goblin phenomenon here. It's not even that his criticism of the government's social policies combined with adoration of those same authorities, but that many genuine leftists successfully spoke on his platform. And I've heard many times from Rabkor viewers that they came to us through Goblin. The same can be said about several other platforms. There's simply no point in listing them now. At that time, it was easier for us to gain access to a patriotic platform cultivating Soviet nostalgia than to liberal resources. The situation in liberal media only began to change towards the end of the decade, thanks to the arrival of a new generation of professional journalists who didn't hate leftist ideas and sometimes even sympathized with them. It was precisely these young journalists who were able to achieve greater openness in some liberal platforms, influencing editors as well. Meanwhile, the political system continued its evolution in a completely different direction: COVID, the suppression of protests initiated by Navalny, the final subordination of all Duma parties to the government's control, the "foreign agent" laws. And finally, February 24, 2022. Perhaps, morally and even ideologically, we have achieved notable successes, forming stable audiences that have survived the trials of the past three years and have largely survived. We have an environment, personnel, a distinctive culture and tradition. In short, much of what was missing in the 2010s. And paradoxically, against the backdrop of the moral and political collapse of the former official opposition, we are at least more visible and more capable of developing independent political initiatives. But at the same time, society as a whole is oppressed not so much by repression as by depression. The problems of the left are ultimately the problems of Russian society as a whole: weak solidarity, fragile ties, a lack of experience. 8. Are you surprised that most so-called left-wing bloggers, those supposed to awaken and radicalize their audiences, have openly or latently sided with the Russian government in recent years? Moreover, most have no political ambitions and distance themselves from politics. Is this a pattern, or is something wrong? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: As they say, you'll laugh, but I expected it to be even worse. Several people pleasantly surprised me. I completely agree about depoliticization – proclaiming oneself "left" doesn't at all imply any activity or even a position on current political issues. But there's another curious point regarding post-Soviet Stalinists. The fact is that, historically, Stalinist ideology has gone through several stages and changed significantly. The ideology of the 1930s, which still contains a lot of revolutionary rhetoric, references to class interests, and so on, is one thing. The ideology of 1948-1953, which essentially paved the way for today's "red empire," is quite another. There's nothing progressive about it. To use familiar terms, I'd say there's been a shift from Soviet Thermidorism to Soviet Bonapartism. And so, in 2022, it immediately became clear which period of Soviet history this or that blogger is looking back to. Many of those oriented toward the ideas of the 1930s were critical of the SVO, while the "red imperialists" naturally supported the government. Everything here is logical. 9. Do you feel like the left-wing media did something wrong in the years leading up to the Ukrainian conflict? Is there a strong bias toward history and criticism of liberals (I'm obviously partly to blame here too), or that they promoted (frankly, anti-Marxist) narratives that created the astonishing phenomenon of a depoliticized leftist audience? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Of course, in hindsight, mistakes always become apparent. But, if we're talking about criticizing liberals, I think we were right. And it's not just a matter of theoretical considerations, but rather the fact that most liberal opponents of the government categorically refused to see the systemic and economic roots of what was happening. In other words, they weren't calling for systemic change, but for replacing some very bad and corrupt people from the state security agencies with very good and decent people, preferably from business. And, of course, for holding fair elections. No one would argue with the latter point, but the current political system didn't emerge out of nowhere; it rests on certain relationships between economic power and property, on a social structure that not only presupposes blatant social and wealth inequality but also alienates the vast majority of citizens, including even the middle class, from participating in decision-making. And if we want to gain mass support for change, we must talk about all of this. And criticize liberals for their inconsistency, for the fact that many of them are afraid of democracy and don’t even hide it. Naturally, criticism can come in many forms. It's foolish, of course, to criticize liberals simply for being liberals. Or to forget those decent and courageous people from the liberal camp with whom we now share common problems. We simply can't confuse democratic solidarity with a lack of personal perspective. And, of course, criticism must be substantive and accurate. Leftists who, instead of engaging in reasoned debate, simply start throwing out slogans will achieve nothing good. We must understand that a serious reassessment of values is currently underway among liberal activists. This doesn't mean they will all become leftists tomorrow (although some already are). At the very least, they will listen to us, and it is precisely in such a situation that we are required to clearly and convincingly state our position on specific issues, respect our opponents, and demand respect for ourselves. When one of our mutual acquaintances suddenly starts shouting about "damned leftists" who need to be suppressed, that doesn't exactly resemble democratic solidarity either... 10. Yes, I agree with you. But here, as I see it, the problem also lies in the angle of criticism. You've probably thought many times about how openly right-wing ideas have been and are being promoted in Russia under the red flag. And this applies not only to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation but also to non-systemic parties. Sexism, chauvinism, anti-Semitism, anti-democratic views, vaccine dissidence, conspiracy theories—all these are common attributes of the Russian "left" audience. Do you agree that many "leftists" in Russia are, in practice, right-wing, and that this situation hasn't been rectified over the years of the development of "red YouTube"? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Depoliticization and the promotion of reactionary ideas, in my opinion, are closely related. I often encounter situations where the same person says something quite sensible when the conversation turns, for example, to their professional interests, and then spouts conspiratorial nonsense when the conversation turns to politics or political history. But real politics is always concrete and requires a systemic logic. In other words, politicization organizes and structures consciousness. Is "Red YouTube" to blame for the current state of affairs? Partly, yes, but only partly. Perhaps we should have paid more attention to debunking various reactionary myths and conspiracy theories. And yes, we did strive to expand our audience, including by attracting a public that is far from free of these myths. But there's a subtle point here. On the one hand, we can't condone such things. On the other hand, look at the Western left, who immediately label any ordinary person who tells a politically incorrect joke a fascist. And thereby actually push them toward fascism, and real fascism. Educational work requires constant effort, patience, persistence, and a kind attitude toward people who have fallen victim to ideological manipulation, while remaining completely intolerant of the manipulators themselves and their ideology. I sincerely hope that politicization will accelerate this process. The more practical experience people have in political struggle, the easier it will be for them to understand such matters. 11. Don't you think that February 24 and the subsequent events marked the end of the old left movement in Russia, which emerged from the red-brown movement of the 90s, and that now we stand at a fork in the road, where Marxists have three main paths: 1) the red-conservative one with the support of the authorities; 2) red reconstructionism at the subcultural level and without any real influence on politics; 3) the progressive left path, the contours of which have not yet been defined? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Undoubtedly, the events of February 24, 2022, were a turning point. It became very clear who is worth what, who is capable of what. And the most important thing is not even what happened in 2022, but how it will end. After all, it is in retrospect that the behavior of certain individuals or groups will be assessed. I'm not talking about our assessments—we've already made those—but about how society will perceive what is happening. We are currently in an in-between moment. It has been drastically delayed, but it still lacks any substance. Incidentally, complaints about the left's unformed project are of the same nature. The vagueness of the political situation prevents a left-wing project from being fully formulated, even in its economic aspects. For example, we advocate the nationalization of natural monopolies. But we will only be able to determine a specific plan and forms of nationalization, its boundaries, and organizational capabilities once the prospects for political action open up. Then we will understand who is prepared to support us and to what extent, how to negotiate with and win over allies, and what society will be prepared to accept and support. As democrats, we must take into account the opinion of the masses. But again, this doesn't mean following in the footsteps of the masses. To formulate a project, we must be one step, even half a step, ahead of the process. But we must never detach ourselves from it. 12. Some time ago, many (including you in your book "Between Class and Discourse") criticized leftist influencers for abandoning class and political issues in favor of cultural battles and "online wars." This was especially true of the so-called "Twitter feminists," who formed toxic communities and rushed to "cancel" those who didn't fit their discourse. So, don't you think that today, given the complexity of real politics, defenders of the USSR online have become just like "Twitter feminists," rushing to denounce anyone who criticizes the USSR, with or without reason? And yet, such defenses are either depoliticized or downright reactionary? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Actually, the answer is already contained in the question. Yes, an overly aggressive reaction to certain words and topics is, at the very least, a bad sign. But I think we need to, as they say, dig deeper and consider what exactly people are defending? Which Soviet Union? What about the Soviet experience appeals to them? I can speak for myself. Certainly, the achievement of the revolution was the social state, which, incidentally, only fully took shape in the 1960s, but the declared goal from the very first days was mass education, not only through schools and universities but also through the dissemination of high culture. And, of course, the enormous creative work of transforming an agrarian country into an industrial one, the development of science, and so on. However, the point is that the Soviet Union was an extremely contradictory society. And the aspects of Soviet history I'm talking about didn't simply coexist alongside repression, the suppression of the individual, campaigns against genetics or cosmopolitanism, rampant bureaucracy, and the like—all of this was closely intertwined. And here we see a crucial problem. Those who now so zealously defend the USSR aren't actually defending the USSR, but rather the dark, reactionary, or conservative aspects of Soviet history, precisely those features of the Soviet system that ultimately doomed it to historical defeat. And for us on the left, it's crucial to draw critical conclusions from this experience, lest we repeat it and repeat the defeat. We're not here to revel in nostalgia, but to win. Do you see the difference? 13. You've already heard that I recently released a long video about Stalin's terror against communists and, more broadly, against the left. Do you think it's destructive to raise such topics? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Of course, I heard about the video, although, alas, I couldn't see it. We don't have the internet here. However, I think the question isn't about the video itself, but about the reaction to it. I wonder why there's such a sensitive reaction now? The repression of communists in the USSR is a well-known fact. Weren't there revelations about it back in 1956 at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU? Even if some people didn't like Khrushchev's assessments—some considered them insufficiently radical, others, on the contrary, too categorical—the facts are clear. And a ton of research has been done since then. Some of them, for example, Zemskov's book "Stalin and the People," are often cited by Stalinists themselves when they argue that the number of victims was lower than claimed by liberal anti-Sovietists. This, incidentally, is true—many publications from the late 1980s and 1990s exaggerated the number of victims. But there were victims! Or is nearly 700,000 people executed by the "special troikas" not enough? How many more do you need before you start taking the repressions of the 1930s seriously? So, if the facts are known, why such a reaction? And why, of all places, is the CPRF leadership officially condemning the decisions of the 20th Congress, which have no direct bearing on the current situation? I think there are two reasons. The first is that history is replacing politics. This isn't even depoliticization; it's worse: defending myths becomes the primary focus of activity. Or passivity. And, I repeat, precisely reactionary myths. The myth of the great leader is reactionary in itself because it aims to suppress the independent and democratic activity of the masses. Big Brother thinks for you! Well, the second reason is that they simply want to please the current leadership. Perhaps unconsciously. But it's no secret that the authoritarian legacy of the USSR is fully accepted and approved by the current government. Unlike the progressive Soviet legacy, for example, the emancipation of women, the separation of school and culture from the church, and so on. And more broadly, now, when the struggle for democratic freedoms is becoming the most important aspect of the struggle for social change, we are being offered a cult of authoritarianism and conservatism. In other words, there is already a certain policy here. In the interests of preserving the existing order. Hence the conclusion: Even if someone doesn't like it, questions of democracy must be raised, because these are, ultimately, social issues, class issues. 14. Why do you think Stalin's ghost haunts the leftist movement in Russia? And don't you think it's time to develop a new socialist image—both political and aesthetic? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: As long as the left is associated with the past, we have no future. Of course, you can read polls about Stalin's popularity. But what matters is the questions asked and how they were phrased. How you evaluate Stalin as a person is one thing. Let's discuss, debate, and think about it. But here's another question: would you like to return to 1937? Or even to the Stalin era—without separate apartments, without the internet, without even the right to freely choose your place of residence in your own country? And here we discover that the overwhelming majority of the public doesn't even want to contemplate such a prospect. We must rid ourselves of the ghosts of the past simply because we need the support of the modern majority, the support of people with whom we will build the future, not mourn the great past. 15. Another sore point for today's Russian left movement is the struggle for democratic rights. I, like many others (and I imagine you too), understand that a direct transition between the Putin regime and the socialist regime, between the current society and a socialist society, is impossible. Moreover, dictatorship and restrictions on freedoms are moving us away from a bright future, not bringing us closer. But when this issue is raised, we hear accusations that we "advocate for improving capitalism," that we've "become liberal," and so on. How would you explain to those who don't understand the meaning of the struggle for democratic freedoms why it's necessary? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Let's keep it simple. Please, let someone show me a quote from Marx, Lenin, or even Stalin that explicitly states that a bourgeois dictatorship is better than a bourgeois democracy. Clearly, none of the "classics" ever uttered such utter nonsense. And for the particularly die-hards, I recommend Stalin's speech at the 19th Congress of the CPSU. The key theme there is that communists in capitalist countries must be at the forefront of the struggle for democracy. Why do I say that the question of democracy is a class issue? Because mass self-organization of workers is only possible under conditions of freedom and openness, when many rank-and-file members of the working class, and not just individual heroes and activists, can join leftist organizations, can express their views without fear of repression, and can, finally, influence policy. Including the policies of leftist parties. I understand perfectly well that some leftists don't care about the working masses; they dream of simply becoming bosses and imposing their reforms on the people from above. But these are bad leftists. And most importantly, they will never succeed. 16. Here, I've often encountered the response of those who favor the Generalissimo, claiming that we're moralizing. That Marxism is about historical necessity, not morality and ethics. Is there a place for morality in Marxism? And if so, what could be the solid foundation of such morality for materialists, for whom divine powers and their dogmas do not exist? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: I find it strange to assume that to be a decent person, one must necessarily fear God. But isn't it possible to behave decently just for the sake of it? For example, by not feeling an obsessive desire to harm one's neighbor. And we have a fair number of people who constantly proclaim their faith, but act as if at the devil's behest. Of course, if any of us need God, I have nothing against it. But from a sociological perspective, society simply needs morality, certain moral guidelines, without which the reproduction of social and economic relations would be impossible. These general moral rules can be enshrined in religious form, through the 10 Commandments, for example, or as the moral code of a builder of communism. The point is not that, but that they are reinforced informally, through communication, education, art, and the experience of others from whom one takes one's example. The mere force of law and the threat of repression alone cannot sustain the daily reproduction of society. Something self-evident is needed, based not on the fear of punishment, but on the need for constructive interaction and mutual understanding with others. We cannot do good on a desert island. Marx rightly mocked the "Robinson Crusoe" (likely referring to the "Robinson Crusoe" or "Robinson Crusoe" in Russian). To do good, we need "another." We need social relations. And we, the left, want to change these relations, making them more humane, minimizing violence and coercion. 17. Do you envision a left-wing political force that could become significant in the future and that would replace the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and other organizations? And what should it be like organizationally and ideologically? An orthodox communist party, a party of democratic socialism, a social democratic party? Or could it encompass a whole spectrum of political forces? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Speaking of the changes that have occurred over the past three years, one of the most significant has been the disappearance of the old Duma opposition. We could criticize the opportunism of the CPRF leaders as much as we wanted, convincingly arguing that they weren't truly communists or even leftists, but they remained virtually the only opposition represented in the system, and so people still joined them, and we had to keep an eye on them and respect their monopoly. After February 24, 2022, they finally lost the function that Anatoly Baranov called "providing opposition services to the population." The political landscape in Russia has not only been "cleansed" but also cleared. It's possible to start all over again, and that's wonderful. We not only can and must build a new political force on the left flank, we can and must make it the most modern and advanced on a global scale - and this is our advantage over our Western comrades, for example, because they have to look back at the structures, organizations, and institutions that have been preserved from past years, but we have none of that. Meanwhile, at the global level, the process of re-forming a left movement is already underway. Look at the new party being formed by Jeremy Corbyn's supporters in Britain, and look at the new left leaders in the US. We must not only unite supporters but also find new organizational forms. Let me say right away that I have several organizational ideas that I'd prefer not to reveal prematurely. But these are purely technical. On the political level, it's clear that we'll have to form a coalition. It's impossible to achieve complete ideological homogeneity, but we shouldn't strive for it either. But political unity on key issues is entirely achievable. It's clear that, as Lenin said, "before uniting, we must first dissociate ourselves." And in this sense, the current discussion of history, initiated by "Herald of the Storm," is entirely logical and timely. But it's also clear that a real unification, a coalition, will be built not around the attitude toward Stalin, but around issues of democratization, the nationalization of natural monopolies and the socialization of platforms, around issues of war and peace, education and social rights. And here it will become clear that a significant portion of those now ardently debating the past will be completely uninterested in working for the future. But if someone chooses not to, that will be their choice, their freedom. We must unite a broad coalition around a program of democratic and social reforms, and individual elements of this coalition will be able to retain their ideological distinctives; this is perfectly normal. The discussion of the reform program has already begun; I can cite the "New Course" document, which was discussed about a year ago. In my opinion, the project is too moderate and therefore unrealistic. If the left has a chance, it will be against the backdrop of a profound crisis that requires more radical solutions affecting the structure of power and property. But, of course, we are not talking about total nationalization in the spirit of the old Soviet economy. 18. During the previous upsurge of the leftist movement, when "red" YouTube began to develop, circles began to form en masse. But now it's clear that most of them studied literature from 100-150 years ago, which the circle members viewed as overly dogmatic, often losing its scholarly relevance. Which contemporary books and authors on Marxism do you think are worth studying? And how can Marxists be encouraged to read non-Marxist literature to broaden their horizons and avoid falling into an information bubble? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Essentially, the answer to your question is contained in the question itself. You need to read a variety of literature, including non-Marxist literature. Marx, for example, read not only Engels and himself. And Lenin studied John Maynard Keynes's "The Economic Consequences of the Peace" and entered into correspondence with him. All this is obvious. What's interesting is something else. Our circle members are often not only poorly acquainted with non-Marxist literature, but they don't always read Marx himself carefully. Who, in fact, studied the second and third volumes of "Capital" in their circles? What about the "Paris Manuscripts of 1844"? What about the articles on the British Raj in India? If these texts had been carefully studied, there wouldn't have been so many absurd disputes and complaints against other leftists, especially when they repeated ideas originally expressed by Marx. Or, for example, by Rosa Luxemburg. One must read a large number of works written by left-wing scholars over the past hundred years. A whole library has accumulated, and it contains a wealth of valuable and relevant material. Direct-Media Publishing House is currently attempting to partially fill this gap in its "Red Books" series. Unfortunately, being in prison, I can't fully participate in this work, but I try to help. Ota Shik's "Plan and Market under Socialism" is finally due to be published soon. The series is interesting because it features a variety of authors and currents of socialist thought—from Austro-Marxists to Mao. The reader will draw their own conclusions. The main thing is to overcome ignorance. And among the non-Marxist sociological and economic classics, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Keynes, and Schumpeter are essential reading. Finally, new and useful works are now being published, including in Russian. For example, I disagree with Varoufakis on many points, but I still believe his "Technofeudalism" is now essential reading. As is Srnicek's "Platform Capitalism." 19. I heard you were upset when Trump won the election. And it's clear that his return to the White House has already had dire consequences for both domestic and international affairs. But isn't there a silver lining? After all, thanks to him, the peace process has at least gotten off the ground? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: I disagree that the peace process has been spurred by Trump. Behind-the-scenes talks were already being reported in the summer of 2024. On the contrary, in my view, Trump's policies have led the process to a dead end. He believed that by offering Moscow favorable terms, he would quickly achieve the desired result. But he categorically failed to understand the causes and dynamics of this conflict, which is not rooted in a struggle for territory or the ideology of the "Russian world," but in the domestic political problems of Russia and, to some extent, Ukraine. Agreeing on the basis of a geopolitical deal is impossible simply because geopolitical considerations, or even the question of who will seize rare earth metal deposits, are completely secondary. The main issue is the transition of power in the Kremlin. And in Ukraine, I believe, the question of a redistribution of power is also at play, only in a different form. The end of the war means the end of the current political landscape. It doesn't even matter how the military actions end. Peace is a challenge that no one is prepared for, a challenge that they are terrified of. But it is nevertheless inevitable. I used to think there would be a peace agreement, and then, as a consequence, a transfer of power. Now I think it will be the other way around: first a transfer, then peace. In any case, it seems to me that Trump has only delayed and confused the matter. 20. Now, it seems, a new escalation is imminent. Trump is disappointed with Russia's intransigence and is transferring missiles to Ukraine. How do you assess the prospects for peace in 2026? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: As I've already said, the necessary conditions for a ceasefire were already in place by the end of 2024. Both sides understood perfectly well that prolonging the fighting would not improve their strategic position. As for the negotiation process, its delays clearly work against Russia; after each subsequent deal collapses, the next one will only get worse. Trump has already made as many concessions as possible from the very beginning, and the logic of events is forcing him to harden his position. The problem isn't the negotiation process, but the internal dynamics in Moscow. Paradoxically, Kremlin and liberal propaganda paint the same picture: a consolidated elite with a single leader striving for some global goal known only to him. Nothing could be further from reality. There's no such thing as a single leader; the elites are deeply divided and pursuing completely different, often incompatible, goals. But they fear a public rift, so they try to resolve issues by consensus, which is impossible. As a result, long-standing and even prepared decisions are simply not made. It's like a ship drifting by inertia, while on the bridge an endless debate rages about which way to go. How long can this continue? We've been drifting like this for at least a year now. And we can keep drifting until an iceberg appears. What could trigger the iceberg? Some serious military setback or an acute economic and financial crisis. Nothing of the sort is visible yet, but icebergs, as we know, emerge from the fog unexpectedly. And then it doesn't matter whether a collision occurs. The main thing is that those debating on the bridge notice it and finally decide to turn the helm. Everything will happen suddenly and very quickly. In short, the title of Alexei Yurchak's classic book, "It Was Forever, Until It Ended," comes to mind. 21. Some time ago, you and several other political prisoners signed an open letter calling on world leaders to grant amnesty to political prisoners in Russia and Ukraine. How close do you think we are to such an amnesty? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: If there is a transition of power, there will be a peace agreement and an amnesty. But I must remind you again: it's not just about political prisoners. Thousands of people are in camps and prisons under Article 337 – unauthorized absence from a military unit. They're in prison because of the war; they need to be released. And even for ordinary criminal offenses, including so-called "economic" ones, the courts have given out clearly inflated sentences, hoping people will sign contracts with the military. Clearly, the amnesty should be broader, covering not only all political prisoners but other offenses as well. And if we're talking about the long term, judicial reform is needed. Of course, I'm in a minimum-security camp; there are almost no real criminals here. But I can say with certainty about my neighbors: at least a third of them shouldn't have been in prison at all; a simple fine or forced labor would have been enough. 22. Some leftists criticized both your open letter and the speech by Stupin, Lobanov, and Sakhnin at PACE for appealing not to the people and working masses, but to bourgeois politicians and bourgeois political institutions. How would you respond to such claims? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: These are strange claims. If we make a public statement that hundreds of thousands of people can read, we're already appealing to the masses. If we were talking about targeting the elite, we'd need behind-the-scenes negotiations, various visits to influential people, which is precisely what many liberal émigrés do. Fine, let them do it. I don't mind. But we're taking a public stance, trying to influence public opinion in Russia and the West. Speaking of Western politicians, it's the left wing that most frequently raises the issue of political prisoners. Moreover, since the humanitarian crisis erupted around Israel's operation in Gaza, it's become clear that the issue of human rights is becoming divisive and highly ideological. The leftist, internationalist position holds that everyone has an equal right to life and freedom—Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Palestinians. 23. Let's get back to your camp life. You have several leftist political prisoners in IK-4: you, Ruslan Ushakov, and Gagik Grigoryan. Does this community help? And how are the guys doing? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: A community of political prisoners has formed in Penal Colony No. 4, the core of which is comprised of leftists. But paradoxically, most people serving political sentences aren't actually particularly politicized. They were simply outraged by the events of recent years and began expressing their outrage on social media. As a result, they ended up in Penal Colony No. 4. And only then, when they encounter other political prisoners, do they begin to think in political terms. And even then, not always. But that's where it becomes clear that they are, after all, spontaneously leftist. Not because they've read theoretical books, but simply because of their life experience. Plus, there's the environmental influence. We always get together in a small group, drink tea, discuss the news, and sometimes I'll share something about history or sociology. Some people borrow my books (not just political prisoners, by the way). This is an important lesson for left-wing activists in general: don't isolate yourself within your own circle. We need to engage the ordinary, depoliticized citizen. And to be able to identify with us. Then, advancing the political agenda will be easy. This is hegemony. Not in theory, but in practice. As for our group, of course, we can discuss books and episodes in the leftist movement with Ushakov and Grigoryan, debate them. But everyone else also listens with interest. Denis Anokhin also visits us regularly. I really hope that when we get out of here, we'll work together. Another participant in our tea parties, Valentin Shlyakov, was recently released from Correctional Colony No. 4. Now he writes me letters filled with nostalgia for our evening get-togethers. But overall, Shlyakov's situation is dire—he's unemployed, has housing problems, and has been sentenced to eight years of administrative supervision. What was called public police supervision in tsarist times. In any case, I'm where I belong among these people. There are thousands of political prisoners in Russia. And we can help them not only from the outside, from the outside, but also from within: by supporting the community by supporting each other. I think we're succeeding. 24. I understand that prisons are joyless places, but still: what was the funniest and happiest situation that happened to you or around you in these two years? (Release doesn't count.) BORIS KAGARLITSKY: Oddly enough, quite a lot of absurd and funny things always happen in prison and camp. Actually, there's nothing surprising about the absurdity. Prison itself is, by definition, a rather absurd institution. But I won't say anything in particular right now, because I keep notes, jotting down the most curious stories and the most interesting characters in a notebook. And I won't talk about what happens in prison. I really hope there will be a book, if, of course, I ever get out of here. And in this book, I will write in detail everything that happened here. All the funny, comical, grotesque, and sometimes, of course, slightly creepy stories that I either witnessed or heard during my wanderings through prisons and in IK-4. I think this book will be (at least, I really hope) a success. Well, now wait until I get out of here, because I don't want to make this public before then. 25. Speaking of liberation, if you were in front of Dud, what would you tell him? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: That's an interesting question. I haven't been invited to speak with Dud yet. But if I am, I'll have to praise him first. I think he's grown a lot as a journalist. As you can imagine, I haven't seen his latest work, but there's a huge difference between what he did when he was just starting out in socio-political journalism and what he's accomplished, for example, in 2023. The interview with Lankov was the last one I was able to see, and it's a very fine, professional piece. 26. It's hard to suspect me of initially sympathizing with Dud, but I completely agree with you. And when you're released, you'll have plenty to watch. Interviewing Volkov is practically a form of modern art. But I'd like to ask you one last question. What would be the first thing you'd like to do once you're free? BORIS KAGARLITSKY: We'll talk about release when I'm finally released. My two-month breaks between arrests don't really count. Neither do visits, which give you the chance to feel like you're free for a few days or hours. But there's a lot that's instructive and even funny in prison. If I get out of here, as I already said, I'll definitely write a book. It even has a title: "Walks with Leviathan." I assure you, it'll be very funny. My neighbors and even my coworkers already know about this yet-to-be-written book. I remember in Rzhev, the head of the operations unit called me in and asked, "Are you really writing a book about prison?" I said, "Yes, I am." He said, "Well, please write about our problems." We're short on funding and can't do the repairs properly." I promised. I'll write! Of course, I have big plans. Political and literary. But first, I need to focus on getting my health back. Nothing terrible happened to me here, but still, a camp is not a resort. Besides, I have a family. There are lots of people who want to see me. And, of course, there's my cat, Stepan. Everything and everyone takes time. https://rabkor.ru/columns/editorial-columns/2025/10/16/interview-from-behind-bars/ Back |
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